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ABSTRACT
A large body of recent work has investigated the phenomenon
of evasion attacks using adversarial examples for deep learning
systems, where the addition of norm-bounded perturbations to the
test inputs leads to incorrect output classification. Previous work
has investigated this phenomenon in closed-world systems where
training and test inputs follow a pre-specified distribution. However,
real-world implementations of deep learning applications, such as
autonomous driving and content classification are likely to operate
in the open-world environment. In this paper, we demonstrate the
success of open-world evasion attacks, where adversarial examples
are generated from out-of-distribution inputs (OOD adversarial
examples). In our study, we use 11 state-of-the-art neural network
models trained on 3 image datasets of varying complexity. We first
demonstrate that state-of-the-art detectors for out-of-distribution
data are not robust against OOD adversarial examples. We then
consider 5 known defenses for adversarial examples, including state-
of-the-art robust training methods, and show that against these
defenses, OOD adversarial examples can achieve up to 4× higher
target success rates compared to adversarial examples generated
from in-distribution data. We also take a quantitative look at how
open-world evasion attacks may affect real-world systems. Finally,
we present the first steps towards a robust open-world machine
learning system.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML), spurred by the advent of deep neural net-
works, has become ubiquitous due to its impressive performance
in domains as varied as image recognition [72, 108], natural lan-
guage and speech processing [29, 33, 55], game-playing [16, 89, 107]
and aircraft collision avoidance [63]. However, its ubiquity pro-
vides adversaries with both opportunities and incentives to develop
strategic approaches to fool machine learning systems during both
training (poisoning attacks) [14, 61, 90, 103] and test (evasion at-
tacks) [18, 45, 87, 88, 97, 114] phases. This paper’s focus is evasion
attacks which have been proposed against supervised ML algo-
rithms used for image classification [13, 18, 24, 45, 97, 114], object
detection [26, 83, 127], image segmentation [6, 41], speech recog-
nition [19, 133] as well as other tasks [27, 48, 65, 129]; generative
models for image data [68], and even reinforcement learning al-
gorithms [59, 69]. Successful instantiations of these attacks have
been demonstrated in black-box [12, 15, 25, 82, 95, 96, 114] as well
as physical settings [40, 73, 106, 110]. The vast majority of these
attacks consider adversarial examples generated from inputs taken
from the training or test data (referred to as in-distribution exam-
ples henceforth).
In this paper, we consider the threat posed by evasion attacks in
the open-world learning model, where the ML system is expected
∗Equal contribution. Corresponding author (vvikash@princeton.edu)
to handle inputs that come from the same input space as the in-
distribution data, but may arise from completely different distri-
butions, referred to as out-of-distribution (OOD) data. Motivated
by the fact that real-world applications of machine learning are
likely to operate in the open-world environment, this problem has
been studied widely under the context of out-of-distribution detec-
tion, anomaly detection, and selective prediction [3, 9, 10, 22, 23, 34,
35, 37, 43, 49, 53, 54, 62, 75, 77–79, 81, 104, 131, 135]. Indeed, there
have been many recent attempts extending the state-of-the-art deep
learning systems to the open-world environment [9, 10, 49, 131].
However, we note that work on the open-world learning model
has not considered the presence of adversaries, while work on ad-
versarial examples has been restricted to generating them from
in-distribution adversarial examples. We close this gap by consid-
ering adversaries operating in the open-world learning setting that
carry out evasion attacks by modifying OOD data (compliant with
the environment/application constraints, if any) with the aim of
inducing high-confidence targeted misclassification.
To carry out evasion attacks on open-world learning models, we
introduce out-of-distribution (OOD) adversarial examples: adversar-
ial examples created by perturbing an OOD input to be classified as a
target classT , where an OOD input is an arbitrary input drawn from a
distribution different from training/test distribution. We demonstrate
that OOD adversarial examples are able to bypass current OOD
detectors as well as defenses against adversarial examples (Table 1).
Under the taxonomy of attacks on ML systems laid out by Huang
et al. [58], OOD adversarial examples are a form of exploratory
integrity attacks with the intent of targeted misclassification of in-
put data. Intuitively, we would expect a well-behaved classifier to
classify an OOD adversarial example with low confidence, since it
has never encountered an example from that portion of the input
space before. This intuition underlies the design of state-of-the-art
OOD detectors. However, OOD adversarial examples constitute an
integrity violation for classifiers as well as OOD detectors as they
induce high confidence targeted misclassification in state-of-the-
art classifiers, which is unwanted system behavior. While previous
work [45, 94, 106, 110] has hinted at the possibility of generating
adversarial examples without the use of in-distribution data, we
are the first to rigorously examine OOD adversarial examples and
their impact on ML classifiers, including those secured with state-
of-the-art defenses, as well as OOD detectors.
1.1 Contributions
We now detail our contributions in this paper.
Introduction and analysis of open-world evasion attacks:We
introduce open-world evasion attacks and propose OOD adversarial
examples to carry out these attacks. We study their impact on state-
of-the-art classifiers, both defended and undefended, as well as on
OOD detectors. We consider 11 different neural networks trained
across 3 benchmark image datasets of varying complexity. For each
dataset used for training, we use 5 OOD datasets for the generation
of OOD adversarial examples in order to determine the effect of the
choice of OOD data on robustness.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
01
72
6v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  5
 M
ay
 20
19
Table 1: Distinguishing between the key properties of unmodified and adversarial in-distribution and out-of-distribution
(OOD) images for CIFAR-10 trained models. In an open-world environment, the adversary can construct adversarial exam-
ples using OOD inputs, called OOD adversarial examples. In contrast to non-modified OOD inputs, OOD adversarial examples
achieve high confidence targeted classification. Mitigation strategies such as robust training and OOD detection are largely
ineffective against OOD adversarial examples.
Input Images Category Predictedclass
Mean output
Classification confidence
Mitigation using
robust training
Mitigation using
OOD detectors
In-distribution
(unmodified)
Airplane, Automobile, Bird, Cat, Deer,
Dog, Frog, Horse, Ship, Truck 0.99 N.A. N.A.
In-distribution
(adversarial) Cat 1.00 ✓ N.A.
Out-distribution
(unmodified)
Truck, Horse, Truck, Truck, Ship,
Ship, Truck, Frog, Bird, Airplane 0.53 X ✓
Out-distribution
(adversarial) Cat 1.00 X X
Evading state-of-the-art OOD detectors: We evaluate the ro-
bustness of the state-of-the-art OOD detection mechanisms ODIN
[79] and Confidence-calibrated classifiers [77] against OOD adver-
sarial examples. Our results show that the OOD detectors, which
can detect close to 85% of non-modified OOD inputs, fail to detect a
significant percentage of OOD adversarial examples (up to 99.8%).
Bypassing state-of-the-art defenses for in-distribution attacks:
Although state-of-the-art defenses such as iterative adversarial
training [84] and provably robust training with the convex outer
polytope [67] are promising approaches for the mitigation of in-
distribution attacks, their performance significantly degrades with
the use of OOD adversarial examples. We demonstrate that OOD ad-
versarial examples can achieve a significantly higher target success
rate (up to 4× greater) than that of adversarial examples generated
from in-distribution data. Further, we demonstrate that OOD ad-
versarial examples are able to evade adversarial example detectors
such as feature squeezing [128] and MagNet [86], with close to
100% success rate (similar to in-distribution adversarial examples).
We also show this for the Adversarial Logit Pairing defense [64].
OOD adversarial examples in the real world:We demonstrate
the success of OOD adversarial examples in real-world settings by
targeting a content moderation service provided by Clarifai [28].
We also show how physical OOD adversarial examples can be used
to fool traffic sign classification systems.
Towards robust open-world learning:We explore if it is possible
to increase the robustness of defended models by including a small
number of OOD adversarial examples during robust training. Our
results show that such an increase in robustness, even against OOD
datasets excluded in training, is possible.
Overall, we demonstrate that considering the threats posed to
open-world learning models is imperative for the secure deploy-
ment of ML systems in practice.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section we present the background and related work on
adversarial examples generated from in-distribution data, defenses
against evasion attacks and state-of-art detection methods for un-
modified OOD data.
2.1 Supervised classification
Let X be a space of examples and let Y be a finite set of classes. A
classifier is a function f (·) : X → Y. Let P(Y) be the set of probabil-
ity distributions overY. In our setting, a classifier is always derived
from a function д(·) : X → P(Y) that provides confidence infor-
mation, i.e. f (x) = argmaxi ∈Y д(x)(i). In particular, for DNNs, the
outputs of the penultimate layer of a neural network f , representing
the output of the network computed sequentially over all preceding
layers, are known as the logits. We represent the logits as a vector
ϕf (x) ∈ R |Y | . The classifier is trained by minimizing the empirical
loss 1n
∑n
i=1 ℓд(xi ,yi ) over n samples {(x1,y1), . . . (xn ,yn )} (train-
ing set), where ℓд(·, ·) is a loss function such as the cross-entropy
loss [44] that depends on the output confidence function д(·) [91].
The training set is drawn from a distribution P inX ,Y over the domain
X ×Y. The marginal distribution over the space of examples X is
represented as P inX . These samples usually represent an application-
specific set of concepts that the classifier is being trained for.
2.2 Evasion attacks
We focus on test phase or evasion attacks.
2.2.1 Adversarial examples generated from in-distribution data. Eva-
sion attacks have been demonstrated to be highly successful for a
number of classifiers [13, 18, 40, 45, 73, 88, 97, 110, 113, 114, 118]. All
of these aim to modify benign, in-distribution examples x ∼ P inX by
adding a imperceptible perturbation to them such that the modified
examples x˜ are adversarial [114]. The adversary’s aim is to ensure
that these adversarial examples are successfully misclassified by the
ML system in a targeted class (targeted attack), or any class other
than the ground truth class (untargeted attack). We focus entirely
on targeted attacks since these are more realistic from an attacker’s
perspective and are strictly harder to carry out than untargeted
attacks. To generate a successful targeted adversarial example x˜
for class T starting from a benign example x for a classifier f , the
following optimization problem must be solved
f (x˜) = T s.t. d(x˜, x) < ϵ (1)
where d(·, ·) is an appropriate distance metric for inputs from the
input domain X used to model imperceptibility-based adversarial
constraints [18, 45]. The distance metric imposes an ϵ-ball con-
straint on the perturbation. The optimization problem in Eq. 1
is combinatorial and thus difficult to solve. In practice, a relaxed
version using an appropriate adversarial loss function ℓadvд (x,T )
derived from the confidence function д(·) is used and solved with
an iterative optimization technique [7, 18, 45, 84, 88, 114]. Details
of the state-of-the-art attack methods we use are in Section 4.2.
2.2.2 Real-world attacks. Work on adversarial examples has also
examined the threat they pose in real-world settings. One line
of work has been to analyze attacks on black-box models hidden
behind APIs [12, 15, 25, 60] where access to the internals of a model
is often unavailable due to privacy concerns. In these settings,
gradient estimation techniques or other black-box optimization
techniques such as particle swarm optimization [12] are used to
generate adversarial examples. Further, the possibility of using
physically realized adversarial examples [5, 8, 40] to attack ML
systems has also been considered. Since the image capture process
introduces artifacts related to brightness, scaling and rotation, these
have to be considered in the adversarial example generation process,
which is done using the expectation over transformations method
[8]. We examine both of these attacks for OOD adversarial examples
in Section 5.4.
2.2.3 Threat models. Based on the degree of access the adversary
has to the classifier under attack, different threat models can be
defined. The two threat models we consider in this paper are:
White-box: In this threat model, the adversary has full access to
the classifier under attack, including any possible defenses that
may have been employed, as well as the training and test data
[7, 18, 45, 114]. This is the threat model under which the evaluation
of defenses has been recommended in the literature [7, 18] in order
to avoid reliance on ‘security through obscurity’ and is the primary
threat model used in this paper.
Black-box with query access: This is a more restrictive threat
model, where the adversary is only assumed to have access to the
output probability distribution д(·) for any input x ∈ X [12, 25, 31,
60, 93]. No access to either the model structure and parameters or
the training and test data is assumed. This is a secondary threat
model we use to demonstrate attacks on cloud-based classifiers [28]
(Section 5.4).
2.3 Defenses against evasion attacks
In order to defend against evasion attacks, there are broadly two
approaches used in the literature as noted in the review by Papernot
et al. [98]. The first, namely robust training, seeks to embed resilience
into the classifier during training by modifying the standard loss
ℓд(·, ·) used during the training process to one that accounts for
the presence of an adversary at test time [45, 67, 84, 101, 115].
The second approach adds additional pre-processing steps at the
input in order to detect or defend against adversarial examples
[11, 50, 86, 105, 111, 126, 128].
2.3.1 Robust training. Robust training can be performed either in
a heuristic manner through the use of adversarial training [45, 64,
74, 84, 115] or in a provable manner with the use of neural network
verification [36, 42, 46, 119–122, 125]. Since exact verification of
state-of-the-art neural networks is inefficient due to their size and
complexity, convex relaxations are used for training provably robust
networks[67, 101, 109, 123].
Adversarial training: These heuristic methods defend against
adversarial examples by modifying the loss function such that it
incorporates both clean and adversarial inputs.
ℓ˜д (x, y) = α ℓд (x, y) + (1 − α )ℓд (x˜, y), (2)
where y is the true label of the sample x.
In this paper, we consider the robustness of networks trained
using iterative adversarial training [84], which uses adversarial ex-
amples generated using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). This
method has been shown to be empirically robust to adaptive white-
box adversaries using adversarial examples generated from in-
distribution data which use the same Lp norm [7] for models trained
on the MNIST [76] and CIFAR-10 [71] datasets.
Provable robustness using convex relaxations: We focus on
the approach of Kolter and Wong [67, 123] which scales to neural
networks on the CIFAR-10 dataset [71]. They aim to certify robust-
ness in an ϵ-ball around any point in the input space by upper
bounding the adversarial loss with a convex surrogate. They find a
convex outer approximation of the activations in a neural network
that can be reached with a perturbation bounded within an ϵ-ball
and show that an efficient linear program can be used to minimize
the worst case loss over this region. In Section 5.2, we show reduced
effectiveness of these two robust training based defenses for OOD
adversarial examples.
2.3.2 Adversarial Example Detectors and secondary defenses. Seek-
ing to exploit the difference in the properties of adversarial and
unmodified inputs for in-distribution data, a large number of adver-
sarial example detectors have been proposed [47, 50, 86, 105, 111,
126, 128]. We consider two of the most promising detectors, namely
feature squeezing [128] and MagNet [86]. Both methods use input
pre-processing in order to distinguish between benign and adver-
sarial examples, but feature squeezing performs detection solely
based on classifier outputs, while MagNet can perform detection at
both the input and output. Unfortunately, these methods are not
robust against adaptive white-box adversaries generating adver-
sarial examples from in-distribution data [7, 17, 52]. In Section 5.3,
we show that this lack of robustness persists for OOD adversarial
examples.
Iterative adversarial training proposed by Madry et al. [84] does
not converge for Imagenet-scale models [84]. The Adversarial Logit
Pairing (ALP) [64] defense claimed to provide robustness for Imagenet-
scale models by adding an additional loss term proportional to the
distance between ϕ(x) and ϕ(x˜) during training, with x˜ generated
using PGD. However, it was shown that simply increasing the num-
ber of PGD iterations used to generate adversarial examples from
in-distribution data reduced the additional robustness to a negligi-
ble amount [38]. In Section 5.2, we show that this lack of robustness
persists for OOD adversarial examples.
2.4 Open-world Deep learning
The closed-world approach to deep learning, described in Section
2.1 operates using the assumption that both training and test data
are drawn from the same application-specific distribution P inX ,Y .
However, in a real-world environment, ML systems are expected
to encounter data at test time that is not drawn from P inX ,Y but
belongs to the same input space, i.e. they encounter samples that
are out-of-distribution (OOD). This leads to the open-world learning
model. Thus, in order to extend supervised learning algorithms to
the open-world learning model, it is critical to enable them to reject
out-of-distribution inputs. The importance of this learning model is
highlighted by the fact that a number of security and safety-critical
applications such as biometric authentication, intrusion detection,
autonomous driving, medical diagnosis are natural settings for the
use of open-world machine learning [21, 49, 80, 102].
2.4.1 Out-of-Distribution data. To design and evaluate the success
of an open-world ML approach, it is first critical to define out-of-
distribution data. Existing work on open-world machine learning
[9, 10, 35] defines an example x as OOD if it is drawn from a mar-
ginal distribution PoutX (over X, the input feature space) which is
different from P inX and has a label set that is disjoint from that of
in-distribution data. As a concrete example, consider a classifier
trained on the CIFAR-10 image dataset [70]. This dataset only has
10 output classes and does not include classes for digits such as ‘3’
or ‘7’ like the MNIST [76] dataset or ‘mushroom’ or ‘building’ like
the Imagenet dataset [32]. Thus, these datasets can act as a source
of OOD data.
2.4.2 OOD detectors. Here, we only review recent approaches to
OOD detection that scale to DNNs used for image classification.
Hendrycks and Gimpel [53] proposed a method for detecting OOD
inputs for neural networks which uses a threshold for the output
confidence vector to classify an input as in/out-distribution. This
method relies on the assumption that the classifier will tend to
have higher confidence values for in-distribution examples than
OOD examples. An input is classified as being OOD if its output
confidence value is smaller than a certain learned threshold.
In this work, we evaluate the state-of-the-art OOD detectors for
DNNs proposed by Liang et al. [79] (ODIN) and Lee et al. [77] which
also use output thresholding for OOD detection but significantly
improve upon the baseline approach of Hendrycks and Gimpel
[53]. The ODIN detector uses temperature scaling and input pre-
processing to improve detection rates. Lee et al. [77] propose a
modification to the training procedure to ensure that the neural
network outputs a confidence vector which has probabilities uni-
formly distributed over classes for OOD inputs. However, as OOD
inputs are unavailable at training time, they generate synthetic data,
using a modified Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), which
lies on the boundary between classes to function as OOD data.
Summary and implications: Most previous work on adversarial
examples has used data from the training or test datasets as start-
ing points for the generation of adversarial examples. However,
given the the importance of open-world machine learning for the
deployment of machine learning systems in practice, this choice
fails to consider an important attack vector. On the other hand, previ-
ous work dealing with the open-world learning paradigm (Section
2.4) has largely not considered the possibility that this data could
be adversarial, in addition to being OOD. In the next section, we
demonstrate how we combine the two paradigms of open world
learning and evasion attacks.
3 OPEN-WORLD EVASION ATTACKS
Deployed ML systems must be able to robustly handle inputs which
are drawn from distributions other than those used for training/testing.
We thus define open-world evasion attacks, which can use arbitrary
points from the input space to generate out-of-distribution adversar-
ial examples, making our work the first to combine the paradigms
of adversarial examples and open-world learning. We then analyze
how they are effective in bypassing OOD detectors and defenses for
in-distribution adversarial examples, including adversarial example
detectors, making them a potent threat in the open-world machine
learning model. These results are summarized in Table 2. Finally,
we examine how robustness against OOD adversarial examples can
be achieved.
3.1 OOD adversarial examples
In the open-world learning model, an adversary can generate ad-
versarial examples using OOD data, and is not restricted to in-
distribution data. In order to carry out an evasion attack in this
setting, the adversary generates an OOD adversarial example start-
ing from xOOD.
Definition 1 (OOD adversarial examples). An OOD adversarial
example x˜OOD is generated from an OOD example xOOD drawn
from PoutX by adding a perturbation δ with the aim of inducing
classification in a target class T ∈ Y1, i.e. f (x˜OOD) = T .
Any attack method used to generate adversarial examples start-
ing from in-distribution data [7, 24, 45, 114], even against defended
classifiers, can be used to generate OOD adversarial examples.
These attack methods are typically calibrated to ensure that adver-
sarial examples are misclassified with high confidence (see Section
4 on our design choices). Next, we highlight the importance of con-
structing OOD adversarial examples to fool classifiers by discussing
the limitations of directly using unmodified/benign OOD data.
Limitations of unmodifiedOODdata for evasion attacks:While
unmodified OOD data already represents a concern for the deploy-
ment of ML classifiers (Section 2.4), we now discuss why they are
Table 2: Summary of results on CIFAR-10 trained models. Novel results and empirical conclusions from this paper are in bold.
The last column shows the successful OOD adversarial examples for each defense, where each of them is generated to be
classified as an airplane by the network.
Behavior on data type
Defense Type Defense Name
In-distribution adversarial
(white-box, adaptive)
Out-of-distribution adversarial
(white-box, adaptive)
Representative
OOD adversarial examples
N.A. Undefended
Not robust [18, 84]
Rate: 100.0, Conf: 1.00
Not robust
Rate: 100.0, Conf: 1.00 (ImageNet)
Robust
Training
Iterative adv. training [84]
Somewhat robust [84]
Rate: 22.9, Conf: 0.81
Not robust
Rate: 87.9, Conf: 0.86 (Gaussian Noise)
Convex polytope relaxation [67]
Provably robust [67]
Rate: 15.1, Conf: 0.41
Somewhat robust
Rate: 29.1, Conf: 0.32 (Gaussian Noise)
OOD
Detection
ODIN [79] N.A.
Not robust
Rate: 81.6, Conf: 0.97 (Internet Photographs)
Confidence-calibrated [77] N.A.
Somewhat robust
Rate: 47.1 , Conf: 0.99 (VOC12)
severely limited from an adversarial perspective. First, with un-
modified OOD data, the typical output confidence values are small,
while an attacker aims for high-confidence targeted misclassifi-
cation. Second, the attacker will have no control over the target
class reached by the unmodified OOD example. Finally, due to the
low typical output confidence values of unmodified OOD exam-
ples they can easily be detected by state-of-the-art OOD detectors
(Section 2.4.2) which rely on confidence thresholding. We provide
quantitative evidence for this discussion by comparing the behavior
of state-of-the-art classifiers on unmodified OOD data and OOD
adversarial examples (details in Appendix B).
3.1.1 Evading OOD detectors. OOD detectors are an essential com-
ponent of any open-world learning system and OOD adversarial
examples should be able to bypass them in order to be successful.
State-of-the-art OOD detectors mark inputs which have confidence
values below a certain threshold as being OOD. The intuition is that
a classifier is more likely to be highly confident on in-distribution
data. Recall that when generating adversarial examples, the adver-
sary aims to ensure high-confidence misclassification in the desired
target class. The goal of an adversary seeking to generate high-
confidence targeted OOD adversarial examples will align with that
of an adversary aiming to bypass an OOD detector. In other words,
OOD adversarial examples that achieve high-confidence targeted mis-
classification also bypass OOD detectors. Our empirical results in
Section 5.1 demonstrate this conclusively, with OOD adversarial
examples inducing high false negative rates in the OOD detectors,
which mark them as being in-distribution.
3.1.2 Evading robust training based defenses. Robustly trained neu-
ral networks [67, 84, 101] (recall Section 2.3.1), incorporate the
attack strategy into the training process. Since the training and
test data are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion, the resulting neural net-
works are robust at test time as well. However, these networks
may not be able to provide robustness if the attack strategy were
to be changed. In particular, we change the starting point for the
generation of adversarial examples and since the training process
for these robust defenses does not account for the possibility of OOD
data being encountered at test time, they remain vulnerable to OOD
adversarial examples. We find that for defenses based on robust
training, OOD adversarial examples are able to increase targeted
success rate by 4× (Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). This finding illustrates
the potent threat of open-world evasion attacks, which must be ad-
dressed for secure deployment of ML models in practice. We further
demonstrate that adversarial example detectors such as MagNet
and Feature Squeezing can be similarly bypassed by incorporating
the metrics and pre-processing they use into the attack objective
for OOD adversarial examples.
3.1.3 Real-world attacks. Since the aim of the open-world threat
model is to elucidate the wider range of possible threats to a de-
ployed ML model than previously considered, we analyze the pos-
sibility of realizing OOD adversarial examples in the following
real-world settings:
(1) Physical attacks: We consider attacks on a traffic sign
recognition system where an adversary uses custom signs
and logos in the environment as a source of OOD adver-
sarial examples, since the classifier has only been trained
on traffic signs. In a physical setting, there is the additional
challenge of ensuring that the OOD adversarial examples
remain adversarial in spite of environmental factors such as
lighting and angle. We ensure this by incorporating random
lighting, angle and re-sizing transformations into the OOD
adversarial example generation process [5, 8, 40].
(2) Query-limited black-box attacks:We use OOD adversar-
ial examples to carry out a Denial of Service style attack
on a content moderation model provided by Clarifai [28],
by classifying clearly unobjectionable content as objectionable
with high confidence. Since we only have query-access to the
model being attacked, the model gradients usually needed
to generate adversarial examples (see Section 4.2) have to be
estimated. This is done using the finite difference method
with random grouping based query-reduction [12].
Our results in Section 5.4 show that OOD adversarial examples
remain effective in these settings and are able to successfully attack
content moderation and traffic sign recognition systems.
3.2 Towards Robust Open-World Deep
Learning
A robust open-world deep learning system is expected to satisfy the
following two properties: (i) It should have high accuracy in detect-
ing unmodified and adversarial OOD inputs; (ii) It should have high
accuracy in classifying unmodified and adversarial in-distribution
inputs. To move towards a robust open-world deep learning system,
we take inspiration from previous work on selective prediction
[23, 37, 43, 85] which augments classifiers for in-distribution data
with an additional class (referred to as background class) so they can
be extended to open-world learning environment and detect OOD
inputs. Further, since iterative adversarial training [84] enables the
robust classification of in-distribution adversarial examples, we
can intuit that a similar approach may provide robustness to OOD
adversarial examples. Thus, we examine a hybrid approach where
we use iterative adversarial training to ensure robust classification
of OOD data, both unmodified and adversarial, to the background
class. Similar to other OOD detection approaches [53, 54, 77, 79],
selective prediction is semi-supervised, i.e. it assumes access to
a small subset of OOD data at training time. We note that since
all of these state-of-the-art approaches consider the detection of
specific (multiple) OOD datasets, we follow the same methodology
for robust OOD classification. To achieve robust classification in the
open-world environment, we perform iterative adversarial training
with the following loss function:
ℓ˜д(xin, xOOD,y) = α ℓ˜д(xin,y) + (1 − α)ℓ˜д(xOOD,yb ) (3)
where xin ∈ P inX , xOOD ∈ PoutX , y is true label for sample xin and
yb is the background class. ℓ˜д(·, ·) refers to the robust loss used in
adversarial training (Eq. 2).
The question now arises: to what extent does this formulation
satisfy the two desired properties from a robust open-world learn-
ing system? In particular, we examine if the following goals are
feasible using small subsets of OOD data: i) robust classification of
a single OOD dataset?, ii) generalization of robustness to multiple
OOD datasets while training with a single one?, iii) simultaneous
robustness to multiple OOD datasets while training with data from
all of them? Again, we emphasize that these must be achieved while
maintaining high accuracy on in-distribution data.
Our evaluation in Section 6 answers these questions in the affir-
mative. For example, we observe that a subset as small as 0.5% of
the total number of samples from an OOD dataset can significantly
enhance robustness against OOD adversarial examples.
4 DESIGN CHOICES FOR OPEN-WORLD
EVASION ATTACKS
In this section, we present and examine the design choices we make
to carry out our experiments on both evaluation and training of
classifiers in the open-world model. In particular, we discuss the
types of datasets, attack methods, models and metrics we consider.
4.1 Datasets
We consider 3 publicly available datasets for image classification as
sources of in-distribution data for training (P inX ,Y ). These are MNIST
[76], CIFAR-10 [71], and ImageNet (ILSVRC12 release) [32]. When
one of the above datasets is used for training, all the other datasets
we consider are used as a source of OOD data. We consider two
types of OOD data: i) semantically meaningful OOD data and ii)
noise OOD data.
Semantically meaningful OOD data: Datasets such as MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and Imagenet are semantically meaningful as the images
they contain generally have concepts recognizable to humans. To
further explore the space of semantically meaningful OOD data,
we also consider the VOC12 [39] dataset as a source of OOD data.
Further, to emulate the type of data that may be encountered in an
open-world setting, we construct a Internet Photographs dataset by
gathering 10,000 natural images from the internet using the Picsum
service [100]. To avoid any ambiguity over examples from different
datasets that contain similar semantic information, we ensure the
label set for semantically meaningful OOD examples is distinct
from that of the in-distribution dataset. Additional details of these
datasets are in Appendix A.
Noise OOD data: By definition, OOD data does not have to contain
recognizable concepts. Thus, we construct a Gaussian Noise dataset
consisting of 10,000 images for each of which the pixel values are
sampled from a Gaussian distribution. This dataset is very different
from the image datasets considered before as it consists of random
points in the input space which have no relation to any naturally
occuring images. In settings where inputs to an ML classifier are
not checked for any sort of semantics, this dataset is a viable input
and thus must be analyzed when checking for robustness.
4.2 OOD Evasion Attack Methods
Iterative optimization based methods have been found to be the
most effective for solving the relaxed version of Eq. 1 [7, 18, 45,
84, 88, 114] to generate successful in-distribution adversarial exam-
ples regardless of the choice of distance function [7, 84]. Thus, we
exclusively use these to generate OOD adversarial examples.
4.2.1 Loss functions and optimizers. We use two commonly used
loss functions ℓд(·,T ) to generate OOD adversarial examples. The
first is the standard cross-entropy loss [44]. The second is the logit
loss from Carlini and Wagner [18]:
ℓadvд (x˜OOD,T ) = max(max{ϕд(x˜OOD)i : i , T } − ϕд(x˜OOD)T ,−κ),
(4)
where κ is a confidence parameter that can be adjusted to control
the strength of the adversarial example.
Optimizer choice: The loss ℓadvд (xOOD,T ) is minimized using Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) which we choose for its state-of-the-
art attack performance [7, 84]. PGD iteratively minimizes the loss
while projecting the obtained minimizer onto the constraint setH
(subset of X depending on d(·, ·)) for t iterations,
x˜tOOD = ΠH(x˜t−1OOD − α · sign(∇x˜t−1ℓadvд (x˜t−1OOD,T ))), (5)
where Π is a projection operator, x˜0OOD = xOOD and x˜
t
OOD is the
final adversarial example. This formulation allows us to work with
fixed constraint setsH , which we use throughout to compare across
datasets, attacks and defenses. As noted by Athalye et al. [7], the
exact choice of the optimizer does not matter much in practice, as
long as an iterative optimization procedure is used. We refer to the
use of PGD with the cross-entropy loss as PGD-xent and with the
logit loss from Carlini and Wagner as PGD-CW.
We run PGD for 100-1000 iterations for every attack. Attacks to
generate OOD adversarial examples usually converge within 100
iterations. If they do not converge in 100 iterations, we monitor the
loss and stop if it has plateaued. The step size is a hyper-parameter
that is varied in each experiment depending on the maximum pos-
sible perturbation and attack performance.
Note. While most of our experiments are for adaptive white-box
adversaries, in Section 5.4 we use query-based black-box attacks
which rely on PGD but due to a lack of access to the true gradient,
we use estimated gradients instead.
4.2.2 Choosing targets for attacks. We only consider targeted at-
tacks for two reasons. First, they are strictly harder than non-
targeted attacks for the adversary [18]. Second, unmodified OOD ex-
amples have no ground truth labels, which raises difficulties in defin-
ing untargeted attacks and comparing them to the in-distribution
case. We use two methods for target label selection for our attacks:
i) random: this refers to the selection of a random target label from
a set that excludes the current predicted label for an unmodified
example (referred to as ‘rand’); ii) least likely: this refers to the
selection of the label with the least value in the output confidence
vector for a given input (referred to as ‘LL’).
4.2.3 Overcoming gradient obfuscation. Defenses such as feature
squeezing [128] obfuscate gradients, which can cause PGD-based at-
tacks to fail due to the presence of uninformative gradients [7, 116].
In particular, Athalye et al. [7] demonstrated that these obfuscated
gradients are caused simply due to complex input pre-processing
which can be approximated by simpler, differentiable transforma-
tions through which gradients are able to pass. We adopt this ap-
proach for our experiments in Section 5.3.
4.2.4 Distance constraints. In this paper, we use the L∞ perturba-
tion constraint for most of our attacks, except for the attack on
feature squeezing [128], where the L∞ metric cannot be used due
to bit depth reduction and thus the L2 perturbation is adopted in-
stead. These metrics are widely used to generate in-distribution
adversarial examples because examples x and x˜ that are ϵ-close in
the these distance metrics, are also visually similar [18, 45, 114]. For
any vector z ∈ Rn , these metrics are:- i) L∞ : ∥z∥∞ = maxi ∈[n] |zi |,
i.e. the absolute value of the largest component of the vector; ii)
L2 : ∥z∥2 =
√∑n
i=1 z
2
i , i.e. the square root of the sum of the squared
value of the components.
Whyuse distance constraints forOODadversarial examples?:
There are two main reasons why we use distance constraints to
generate OOD adversarial examples. The first reason, which ap-
plies only to semantically meaningful OOD data, is to model the
content in the input that the adversary wishes to preserve, in spite
of it being OOD. In other words, the starting point itself models
a constraint on the adversary, which may arise from the environ-
ment (see Section 5.4.2 for an example for traffic sign recognition
systems) or to prevent the OOD adversarial example from having
undesirable artifacts, e.g. turning a non-objectionable image into
an objectionable one (see Section 5.4.1).
The second reason, which applies to both semantically meaning-
ful and noise OOD data, stems from the need to measure the spread
of successful OOD adversarial examples in the input space. Previ-
ous work has measured the spread of adversarial examples around
the training and test data, in terms of Lp distance constraints and
found that for undefended models adversarial examples are present
close to their starting points. On the other hand, while the use of
robust training defenses makes it challenging to find adversarial
examples within a given constraint set, we show for OOD data,
successful OOD adversarial examples can be found in small Lp
balls around unmodified starting points for both undefended and
defended models. We note that for noise OOD data it is possible to
relax distance constraints to generate OOD adversarial examples
which will lead to higher attack success rates. In Section 5.4.2, we
demonstrate open-world evasion attacks using custom signs on
traffic sign recognition systems that do not restrict the perturbation
budget as well.
4.3 Metrics and Models
4.3.1 Evaluation metrics. We consider the following metrics to
measure the performance and robustness of image classifiers:
Target success rate: This is the percentage of adversarial examples
classified as the desired target, which measures model robustness.
Classification accuracy: This is the percentage of in-distribution
test data for which the predicted label matches the ground-truth
label. It is not reported for OOD data as it has no ground truth
labels.
Mean classification confidence: This is themean value of the out-
put probability corresponding to the predicted label of the classifier
on correctly classified inputs in the case of benign in-distribution
data. For adversarial examples, both in-distribution and OOD, it
is the mean value of the output probability corresponding to the
target label for successful adversarial examples. The confidence
values lie in [0, 1].
4.3.2 Models. We experiment with three robust training defenses
(Iterative adversarial training [84], Adversarial logit pairing [64],
and robust training with convex outer polytope [67]), two adversar-
ial example detectors (Feature Squeezing [128] and MagNet [86]),
and two OOD detectors (ODIN [79] and Confidence calibrated
classifiers [77]). These works use multiple different neural network
models, each trained on theMNIST, CIFAR-10, or ImageNet datasets.
We show the architecture and performance of the 11 DNNs from
these works used in this paper in Table 3. We use multiple models
for each dataset to carefully compare with previous work. All the
DNNs we consider are convolutional neural networks as these lead
Table 3: Deep neural networks used for each dataset in this
work. The top-1 accuracy and confidence values are calcu-
lated using the test set of the respective datasets.
Dataset Model Classificationaccuracy (%)
Mean
confidence
MNIST [76]
4-layer CNN(M1) [84]* 98.8 0.98
4-layer CNN (M2) [67]† 98.2 0.98
7-layer CNN (M3) [18] 99.4 0.99
CIFAR-10 [71]
Wide Residual net
(WRN-28-10) [134] 95.1 0.98
WRN-28-10-A [84, 134]* 87.2 0.93
WRN-28-1 [123]† 66.2 0.57
DenseNet [57] 95.2 0.98
VGG13 [108] 80.1 0.94
All Convolution Net [112] 85.7 0.96
ImageNet [32] MobileNet [56] 70.4 0.71ResNet-v2-50 [51, 64]‡
(for 64×64 size images) 60.5 0.28
* Iterative adversarial training from Madry et. al. [84].
† Robust training with convex polytope relaxation from Wong et.
al. [123].
‡ Adversarial logit pairing (ALP) from Kannan et. al. [64].
to the state-of-the-art performance on image classification [2]. To
characterize performance on in-distribution data, we report both the
classification accuracy and mean classification confidence on these
models. Following the convention in previous work [20, 67, 84],
we report the perturbation budget for models trained on MNIST
dataset using [0,1] scale instead of [0,255].
All experiments are run on a GPU cluster with 8 Nvidia P100
GPUs using mainly Python-based Tensorflow [4] to implement and
run DNNs along with the Numpy and Scipy packages for other
mathematical operations. We also use Pytorch [99] in cases when
previous work that we build on has used it. All our code and data
will be publicly released for the purposes of reproducible research.
5 RESULTS
In this section, we present the experimental results. We first eval-
uate the robustness of OOD detectors to OOD adversarial exam-
ples. Next, we analyze the performance of state-of-the-art defenses
against adversarial examples in the open-world learning model. We
also evaluate adversarial detectors and secondary defenses in this
setup. Finally, we demonstrate the relevance of open-world evasion
attacks with real-world attacks using OOD adversarial examples.
5.1 OOD detectors are not robust
In open-world deep learning, the first step is to detect out-of-
distribution inputs. Previous work has demonstrated that unmodi-
fied OOD inputs to a DNN can be detected with high probability
by using an additional detector [77, 79] (recall Section 2.4.2). In
this section, we evaluate the robustness of these OOD detection
approaches to OOD adversarial examples. Specifically, we evaluate
two state-of-the-art OOD detection methods, ODIN [79] and confi-
dence calibrated classification [77], on trained CIFAR-10 models.
OOD detector setup. The success of an OOD detector is measured
by False Negative Rate (FNR), which represents the fraction of OOD
Table 4: False Negative rate (FNR) of ODIN [79] and confi-
dence calibrated classifier [77] approaches for OOD adver-
sarial examples. The results are reported with the respec-
tive models for each detector trained on CIFAR-10 dataset.
The TNR of each detector with in-distribution dataset is 95%.
These results show that a high percentage of OOD adversar-
ial examples can evade OOD detectors. The maximum val-
ues among all OOD datasets are highlighted in bold.
OOD dataset ODIN [79] Confidence-calibratedclassifier [77]
ϵ = 8.0 ϵ = 16.0 ϵ = 8.0 ϵ = 16.0
ImageNet 68.8 97.4 46.4 47.5
VOC12 74.4 97.4 47.1 47.2
Internet
Photographs 81.6 98.7 42.5 45.4
MNIST 72.6 99.8 4.6 5.2
Gaussian
Noise 0 4.2 20.9 21.9
inputs the detector fails to detect. The threshold values reported
in [77, 79] are calibrated such that the True Negative Rate (TNR)
i.e., the fraction of in-distribution inputs the detector classifies as
non-OOD, is equal to 95%. For both detectors, the PGD-xent attack
with 100 iterations and random target label selection is used.
Summary of results.While OOD detectors achieve good detec-
tion performance on unmodified OOD data, these detectors can be
evaded with OOD adversarial examples. The key reason for the fail-
ure to detect OOD adversarial examples is that both ODIN [79]
and confidence calibrated classification [77] rely on low output
confidence values to distinguish OOD examples. As we will discuss
next in Section 5.2 (Table 5), our results show that OOD adversarial
examples can achieve target output classification with confidence
equal to (and often higher than) that of in-distribution images.
5.1.1 Effect of OOD attacks on ODIN. We use the code and pre-
trained DenseNet [57] model on CIFAR-10 dataset from Liang et al.
[79]. For consistency, we follow Liang et al. [79] and use the tem-
perature scaling and perturbation budget for input pre-processing
equal to 1000 and 0.0014 respectively.
OOD adversarial examples can evade the ODIN detector suc-
cessfully. We first test the performance of ODIN with multiple
unmodified OOD datasets. As expected, ODIN achieves more than
78% detection accuracy for all unmodified OOD datasets. However,
the detection rate of ODIN drastically decreases with OOD adversarial
examples (Table 4). For OOD adversarial examples generated with
ImageNet dataset and ϵ of 16, ODIN misses 97.4% inputs. Except
for Gaussian noise, the mean success rate is 98.3% for other OOD
datasets with ϵ = 16. For OOD adversarial examples generated from
Gaussian noise, we observe that the success in evading ODIN is
dependent on the neural network model. As highlighted in Table 4,
a DenseNet model leads to poor success of OOD adversarial exam-
ples from Gaussian noise. However, for a WRN-28-10 model, we
found that the OOD adversarial examples generated from Gaussian
noise achieve FNR close to 100%.
5.1.2 Effect of OOD attacks on confidence calibrated classifiers. For
consistency with prior work of Lee et al. [77], we used a similar
model (VGG13) and training procedure. We also validate the results
from Lee et al. [77] by evaluating this detector on unmodified OOD
datasets.
Up to 47.5% OOD adversarial examples could bypass the de-
tection approach based on confidence calibrated classifiers.
In our baseline experiments with unmodified OOD datasets, we
found that the confidence-calibrated classifier has good detection
performance. For example, unmodified ImageNet andVOC12 dataset
are correctly detected with an accuracy of 83.5% and 88.3%, re-
spectively. However, the detection performance degrades signifi-
cantly for adversarial examples generated from OOD datasets ex-
cept MNIST (Table 4). For example, when ϵ equals to 16, more than
45% adversarial examples generated from ImageNet, VOC12, and
Internet Photographs datasets are missed by the detector.
However, in comparison to ODIN [79], the gradient-based attacks
for this detector fail to achieve close to 100% FNR. We observe that
even with an unconstrained adversarial attack the FNR doesn’t
approach 100%. We speculate that this behavior might be due to
non-informative gradients presented by the model at the input.
It should be noted that first-order attack approaches which can
succeed in presence of obfuscated gradients [7] aren’t applicable
here. This is because instead of any additional input-processing
step the gradients are obfuscated by the model itself.
5.2 Fooling robustly trained models
In this section, we first evaluate the robustness of baseline, unde-
fended models (trained with natural training) to OOD adversarial
examples. Next, we evaluate robustly trained models with OOD
adversarial examples. For robust training, we consider the two
state-of-the-art approaches discussed in Section 2.3.1 which are
iterative adversarial training [84] and robust training using the
convex polytope relaxation [67]. For undefended models, we show
that OOD adversarial examples achieve target success rates almost
identical to adversarial examples generated from in-distribution
data. We further show that robustly trained models are much less
robust against OOD adversarial examples.
5.2.1 Baseline models are highly vulnerable to OOD adversarial
examples. Fig. 1a shows the target success rate with adversarial
examples generated from different OOD datasets for the WRN-
28-10 network (Table 3) trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The x-
axis represents the maximum l∞ perturbation for the PGD-xent
attack used to generate the adversarial examples. The results show
that similar to adversarial examples generated from in-distribution
images, OOD adversarial examples also achieve a high target success
rate. For example, the target success rate increases rapidly to 100%
for both in- and out-of-distribution data.
5.2.2 OOD attacks on adversarially trained models. We now evalu-
ate the robustness of adversarially trained models (iterative adver-
sarial training [84]) to OOD adversarial examples. Previous work
[45, 64, 84, 115] has shown that adversarial training can signifi-
cantly increase the model robustness against adversarial examples
generated from in-distribution data. For example, for the WRN-28-
10 network trained on CIFAR-10, adversarial training reduces the
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(b) Lack of robustness of iterative adversarial training [84].
Figure 1: Target success rate of adversarial examples gener-
ated from different datasets for the state-of-the-art WRN-
28-10 [134] model trained on CIFAR-10 [71]. The PGD-xent
attack is used (Section 4.2) with ϵ (l∞ perturbation budget)
up to 8 and random target label selection. Though iterative
adversarial training [84] (with ϵ = 8) improves robustness
for in-distribution data (CIFAR-10), OOD adversarial exam-
ples are up to 4× as successful as those generated from in-
distribution data.
target success rate from 100% to 22.9% for the PGD-xent attack with
ϵ equal to 8, as shown in Figure 1b.
Experimental details: For the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, we
use the iterative adversarial training approach proposed in Madry
et al. [84]. Models corresponding to MNIST, CIFAR-10 datasets in
this experiment areM1, WRN-28-10-A (Table 3) respectively. Each
model is adversarially trained with an L∞ perturbation budget (ϵ)
equal to 0.3, 8 respectively.
OODadversarial examples generated fromOODdatasets (ex-
cept MNIST) achieve high target success rates for multiple
adversarial trained models and datasets: Fig. 1b shows target
success rate of OOD adversarial examples for aWRN-28-10 network,
trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset using adversarial training, with
different perturbation budget (ϵ) for PGD-xent attack. It shows that
though adversarial training improves robustness for in-distribution
dataset (CIFAR-10), OOD adversarial examples can achieve up to 4×
Table 5: Target success rate of adversarial examples generated from different datasets for models trained with iterative adver-
sarial training [84], adversarial logit pairing (ALP) [64], and convex polytope relaxation [67]. The l∞ norm used to generate
adversarial examples is listed along with the training dataset. The maximum target success by the adversarial examples for
every model is highlighted in bold. The results for in-distribution data are highlighted in italics.
Iterative adversarial
training [84]
Adversarial
logits pairing [64]
Provable
Defenses [67]
Test (↓) \ Train (→)
dataset
MNIST (ϵ = 0.3) CIFAR-10 (ϵ = 8) ImageNet (ϵ = 16) MNIST (ϵ = 0.1) CIFAR-10 (ϵ = 8)
Attack Target
labels
success
rate (%)
confidence success
rate (%)
confidence success
rate (%)
confidence success
rate (%)
confidence success
rate(%)
confidence
clean adv clean adv clean adv clean adv clean adv
MNIST
PGD-xent
rand 1.5
0.98
0.76 5.1
0.81
0.60 98.8
0.27
0.96 0.6
0.97
0.64 3.9
0.48
0.37
LL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.4 0.95 0.0 0.0 0 0
PGD-CW
rand 1.9 0.71 5.7 0.54 97.0 0.91 1.2 0.67 5.1 0.33
LL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.6 0.88 0.0 0.0 0 0
CIFAR-10
PGD-xent
rand 97.6
0.77
0.99 22.9
0.93
0.81 100.0
0.14
0.99 67.2
0.88
0.97 15.1
0.27
0.41
LL 95.3 0.99 5.1 0.69 100.0 0.99 30.3 0.93 0.4 0.15
PGD-CW
rand 97.6 0.99 22.3 0.76 99.9 0.96 61.5 0.97 16.4 0.35
LL 93.8 0.98 4.4 0.60 99.5 0.95 27.6 0.91 0.4 0.15
ImageNet
PGD-xent
rand 97.2
0.79
0.99 44.9
0.74
0.78 99.4
0.30
0.98 72.1
0.88
0.97 23.4
0.40
0.36
LL 94.7 0.98 4.9 0.64 98.9 0.98 33.6 0.93 0.8 0.20
PGD-CW
rand 97.2 0.99 39.5 0.76 98.6 0.90 68.9 0.97 28.4 0.33
LL 93.9 0.97 4.6 58.3 93.9 84.5 30.4 89.1 0.8 0.17
VOC12
PGD-xent
rand 99.3
0.76
0.99 54.9
0.75
0.79 99.9
0.19
0.99 68.7
0.89
0.97 26.4
0.38
0.36
LL 97.5 0.98 11.3 0.61 99.8 0.99 29.9 0.91 0.9 0.21
PGD-CW
rand 98.5 0.99 50.3 0.76 99.7 0.95 63.7 0.96 27.0 0.31
LL 96.0 0.98 9.9 0.55 98.4 0.92 26.0 0.89 1.2 0.16
Internet
Photographs
PGD-xent
rand 95.4
0.74
0.99 46.3
0.74
0.80 100.0
0.17
0.99 58.4
0.89
0.97 19.8
0.43
0.35
LL 92.1 0.98 12.2 0.34 99.6 0.98 26.8 0.93 0.5 0.24
PGD-CW
rand 95.4 0.98 47.5 0.77 99.8 0.96 55.5 0.95 22.4 0.33
LL 91.2 0.96 11.4 0.62 99.0 0.93 23.3 0.91 0.6 0.19
Gaussian
Noise
PGD-xent
rand 100
0.92
1.00 87.9
0.52
0.86 48.5
0.41
0.45 79.0
0.91
0.99 29.1
0.31
0.32
LL 100 1.00 7.1 0.39 0 0 0 0 0 0
PGD-CW
rand 100.0 1.00 87.3 0.81 47.7 0.29 79.7 0.97 28.4 0.30
LL 100 1.00 4.9 0.31 0 0 0 0 0 0
higher target success rate compared adversarial examples generated
from in-distribution images.
Table 5 presents the detailed results for different datasets, attacks,
and label selection. We can see the improvement in target suc-
cess rate with OOD adversarial examples. When using the VOC12
dataset to generate OOD adversarial examples, we can achieve
around 66.7× and 2.4× improvement in target success rate com-
pared to in-distribution attacks for MNIST and CIFAR-10 models
respectively. The mean classification confidence for OOD adversar-
ial examples is also competitive with adversarial examples gener-
ated from in-distribution data and typically higher than unmodified
OOD data. However, achieving the least likely target label (LL) is a
significantly harder objective for evasion attacks with both in- and
out-of-distribution data. For each dataset, we observe that PGD-CW
is relatively less successful than PGD-xent attack.
5.2.3 OOD attacks on robust training with the convex polytope relax-
ation. Robust training using convex polytope relaxation fromWong
et al. [67, 123] provides a provable upper bound on the adversarial
error and thus on target success rate.
Experiment Details:We use the models fromWong et al. [67, 123]
for MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset. The corresponding Models are
M2 and WRN-28-1 respectively (Table 3). These models achieve
the state-of-the-art minimum provable adversarial error with L∞
perturbation (ϵ) equals to 0.1 and 2 for MNIST and CIFAR-10 data
respectively. With more complex dataset such as CIFAR-10, this
defense is limited to the use of a small perturbation budget in train-
ing to avoid reducing the performance on unmodified inputs. For
example, training the WRN-28-1 network using convex polytope
relaxation on CIFAR-10 dataset with a more realistic ϵ of 8 achieves
only 27.1% classification accuracy on unmodified CIFAR-10 test
data. Given that the defense approach cannot simultaneously main-
tain high benign accuracy for CIFAR-10 while using a more realistic
ϵ equals to 8, we make a design choice of ϵ equals to 2 in train-
ing the CIFAR-10 model and ϵ equals to 8 for adversarial example
generation. On the other hand, for simpler dataset such as MNIST,
we continue to use the same ϵ equals to 0.1 for both training and
adversarial example generation.
Robust training with convex polytope relaxation lacks ro-
bustness to OOD adversarial examples: Table 5 shows the ex-
perimental results for MNIST and CIFAR10 models using the prov-
able defense approach of convex polytope relaxation [67, 123].
Though this approach significantly improves the robustness for
in-distribution adversarial examples, it lacks robustness to OOD
adversarial examples. For the model trained on MNIST, the target
success rate increases from 0.6% to 72.1% by using ImageNet as
a source of OOD data with ϵ = 0.1 and PGD-xent attack. Similar
success rate is observed with other OOD datasets for this model.
For the model trained on CIFAR-10 dataset, the target success rate
increases from 15.1% to 29.1% with the use of OOD adversarial
examples generated from Gaussian noise. The relatively poor per-
formance of adversarial examples for the CIFAR-10 model could
be due to the poor classification accuracy of this model, where it
achieves only 66.2% classification accuracy on the CIFAR-10 images.
We argue that the principle behind this defense is not robust to
OOD adversarial examples demonstrated by OOD attacks on the
provably trained MNIST model.
5.2.4 Discussion: Impact of OOD dataset. In this subsection, we
further discuss the influence of dataset selection and robust learning
on the success of evasion attacks. We observe in Table 5 that the
target success rate is affected by the choice of the OOD dataset.
In particular, we observe that the target success rate for MNIST
dataset is significantly lower than both in-distribution and other
OOD datasets. We speculate that this behavior could arise due to
the specific semantic structure of MNIST images. Nevertheless,
we emphasize that the threat posed by OOD adversarial examples
still persists, since adversarial examples from multiple other OOD
datasets achieve high target success rates.
5.3 Evading Adversarial Example Detectors
and Secondary Defenses
5.3.1 Adversarial detectors. Previous work [17, 52] has shown that
both adversarial detectors based on Feature Squeezing [128] or Mag-
Net [86] approach can be evaded with adaptive white-box attacks
accounting for the detector mechanism to generate adversarial ex-
amples from in-distribution data. Our results show that similar to
in-distribution data, these adversarial detectors don’t provide robust-
ness to adversarial examples generated from OOD data. For feature
squeezing, we also show that OOD data requires a smaller L2 pertur-
bation budget than in-distribution data for a similar target success
rate of corresponding adversarial examples. We further show that
OOD adversarial examples can achieve up to 97.3% target success
rate in presence of MagNet on a model trained on the CIFAR-10
dataset. We provide detailed results in Appendix C.
5.3.2 Adversarial logit pairing. The robust training based on it-
erative adversarial training by Madry et al. [84] works well for
small-scale datasets but does not provide robustness with Imagenet.
Adversarial logit pairing [64] extends this approach to provide ro-
bustness on Imagenet. However, ALP suffers from loss of robustness
for in-distribution adversarial examples when the number of attack
iterations is increased [38]. We show that this vulnerability also
exists for OOD adversarial examples (Table 5). We use ResNet-v2-50
(Table 3) and perturbation budget (ϵ) of 16.
5.4 Towards real-world attacks
In this section, we demonstrate how OOD adversarial examples
may affect real-world ML systems.
5.4.1 Attacking Content Moderation systems. To achieve low false
positive rate (FPR), ML classifiers deployed in the real-world are
also expected to detect OOD inputs. The is because a high FPR
can significantly affect the performance [92] and cost [1] of the
service provided by the these models. For example, theMetropolitan
police in London are attempting to use computer vision to detect
nudity in photographs, but a high FPR is reportedly occurring due
to the prevalence of desert scenes as wallpapers etc. [92]. This
example represents an inadvertent denial-of-service (DoS) attack,
where a large number of false positives affects the effectiveness of
the automated content moderation system.
We use OOD adversarial examples to carry out a similar DoS
attack on Clarifai’s content moderation model [28], by classifying
clearly unobjectionable content as objectionable with high confidence.
In a real deployment, a deluge of such data will force human content
moderators to spend time reviewing safe content. Sybil attacks
[30, 132] can enable attackers to create a plethora of fake accounts
and upload large amounts of OOD adversarial examples.
Fooling the Clarifai model: Using the query-based black-box
attacks proposed by Bhagoji et al. [12], we construct OOD adver-
sarial examples for Clarifai’s content moderation model. It provides
confidence scores for the input image belonging the 5 classes ‘safe’,
‘suggestive’, ‘explicit’, ‘gore’ and ‘drugs’, and is accessible through
an API. We use 10 images each from the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST
[124] and Gaussian Noise datasets to generate OOD adversarial
examples. All of these images are initially classified as ‘safe’ by the
model. In Figure 2, we show a representative attack example. Our
attack is able to successfully generate OOD adversarial examples
for the 4 classes apart from ‘safe’ for all 30 images with 3000 queries
on average and a mean target confidence of 0.7.
5.4.2 Physically-realizable attacks on traffic signs. Traffic sign recog-
nition systems are intended for operation in the real-world, where
they encounter arbitrary objects in the environment. These objects
can be modified to become physical OOD adversarial examples
which are detected and classified with high confidence as traffic
signs. We demonstrate attack success with both imperceptible per-
turbations in a OOD logo attack and unconstrained perturbations
within a mask in a custom sign attack. OOD adversarial examples in
Figure 3 are detected and classified with high confidence as traffic
signs (by a CNN with 98.5% accuracy on test data) over a range of
physical conditions when printed out. The targeted attack success
rate is 95.2% for the custom sign attack. Details of these attacks and
further results are in our short workshop paper [5].
6 TOWARDS ROBUST OPEN-WORLD DEEP
LEARNING
In this section, we present experimental results for our proposed
hybrid combination of iterative adversarial training and selective
prediction to enhance classifier robustness against OOD adversarial
Figure 2: OOD adversarial examples against Clarifai’s Con-
tent Moderation model. Left: original image, classified as
‘safe’ with a confidence of 0.96. Right: adversarial example
with ϵ = 16, classified as ‘explicit’ with a confidence of 0.9.
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Figure 3: OOD adversarial examples for a traffic sign recog-
nition pipeline. These adversarial examples are classified as
the desired target traffic sign with high confidence under a
variety of physical conditions when printed out.
examples.We experimentwith image classification taskwith CIFAR-
10 dataset as in-distribution and multiple other datasets as the
source of out-of-distribution images.
Setup: In this experiment we useWRN-28-10 model with the hyper-
parameters from Madry et al. [84] for iterative adversarial training
and CIFAR-10 as the in-distribution dataset (Table II). To train a
robust classifier with a background class, we use 5,000 images from
one of the MNIST, ImageNet, VOC12, and Internet Photographs
datasets. An image will be specified as OOD if it is classified to the
background class. We select random target labels from CIFAR-10
classes as the desired target class (excluding the predicted class for
the unmodified input), and compute the target success rate. This
metric allows us to capture the adversary’s success at both evad-
ing detection and achieving targeted misclassification with OOD
adversarial examples. The number of test images and perturbation
budget (ϵ) is 1000 and 8 respectively.
Small subset of OOD data can enable robust detection.With
each of the OOD dataset, we observe that using only 5,000 training
images leads to significant decrease in the success of adversarial
attacks from these datasets (Fig. 4). For example, after adversarial
training with only 5,000 training images (out of 1.2 million) from
ImageNet, the target success of OOD adversarial examples from
ImageNet dataset decreases from 44.9% to 7.4%.
Robust trainingwith oneOODdataset can generalize tomul-
tiple other OOD datasets. From Figure 4, we observe that adver-
sarial training with one dataset also decreases attack success of
OOD adversarial examples from other datasets. This effect is signif-
icant for feature-rich datasets such as ImageNet and VOC12. For
example, using VOC12 for training reduces the target success rate
of OOD adversarial examples from ImageNet from 44.9% to 15.8%.
MultipleOODdatasets can be combined for robust detection:
By including 5,000 images from each of the four OOD datasets in
robust training, we demonstrate that a single network can learn
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Figure 4: Target success rate of OOD adversarial examples
(lower is better). The classifier is adversarially trained on in-
distribution inputs along with a small subset of OOD data.
It shows that datasets such as VOC12 and ImageNet provide
a high inter-dataset and intra-dataset generalization for de-
tection of adversarial OOD inputs.
robust detection for each of them. We observe that the combination
of all datasets is constructive as the best results are achieved when
multiple datasets are used in training.
Small impact on in-distribution performance: Robust training
with OOD data has a small impact on classifier performance for
in-distribution data. The maximum decrease in benign classification
accuracy is 1% (for single OOD dataset) and 3.1% (for all four OOD
datasets). The robust accuracy remains largely unchanged. Detailed
results are in Table 9 in Appendix D.
Discussion and limitations. Our results highlight that it is feasi-
ble to robustly classify one or multiple OOD datasets along with
in-distribution data using a semi-supervised learning approach.
However, the key challenge in this domain is to achieve robustness
against all OOD inputs. As a first step, our approach and results
motivate the design of robust unsupervised OOD detectors for deep
learning. They also highlight the need for rigorous evaluation meth-
ods to determine the robustness of an open-world learning system
against all possible adversarial examples.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated evasion attacks in the open-world
learning model and defined OOD adversarial examples, which rep-
resent a new attack vector on ML models used in practice. We
found that existing OOD detectors are insufficient to deal with
this threat. Further, assumptions regarding the source of adver-
sarial examples, namely, in-distribution data, have led to tailored
defenses. We showed that these state-of-the-art defenses exhibit
increased vulnerability to OOD adversarial examples, which makes
their deployment challenging. With these findings in mind, we
took a first step at countering OOD adversarial examples using
adversarial training with background class augmented classifiers.
We now urge the community to consider the exploration of strong
defenses against open-world evasion attacks.
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A ADDITIONAL DETAILS FOR THE
DATASETS
Table 6 provides the details of the datasets used in this work. In
particular, it provides the state-of-the-art top-1 classification ac-
curacy for each dataset, which can be used to compare with the
performance of models used in the paper.
Table 6: Details of the three dataset used as as source of in-
distribution images in this work.
Number of
classes
Number of
images (in thousands)
State-of-the-art
classification
accuracy (%)
Train Test/Validation
MNIST 10 60 10 99.79 [117]
CIFAR-10 10 50 10 97.69 [130]
ImageNet
(ILSVRC12) 1000 1281 50 82.7 [136]
We also use VOC12 dataset as a source of OOD images. In addi-
tion, the two datasets we constructed as sources of OOD data are
detailed below:
(1) Internet photographs: We sample 10000 random natural
images from the Picsum random image generator [100],
which is a source of real-world photographs. These images
have dimensions of between 300×300 to 800×800 pixels.
(2) Gaussian noise: We synthesize 10000 random images us-
ing a Gaussian distribution for each pixel value. We set the
mean (µ) of the Gaussian distribution equal to 127 and the
standard deviation (σ ) to 50. We don’t select a very low or
high standard deviation as it leads to very sharp or uniform
distribution in the valid pixel range ([0, 255]) respectively.
B COMPARING THE IMPACT OF
UNMODIFIED AND ADVERSARIAL OOD
DATA
Since the classifier f has never encountered inputs x drawn from
PoutX , it is unclear what its behavior will be. An empirical analysis of
the behavior of state-of-the-art classifiers on unmodified OOD data
motivates the need, from an adversarial perspective, to generate
OOD adversarial examples.
Methodology: We use a wide residual net (WRN-28-10) model
trained on CIFAR-10 dataset to illustrate the differences between
unmodified and adversarial OOD data. The adversary first selects
a target class t ∈ Y and then samples 1,000 images from OOD
datasets which should be classified as class t (Xoutt ). The adversarial
counterparts of these images are generated using the PGD attack
with L∞ norm constraints [84]. Further details of attacks, models
and datasets are in Section 4. For each set of examples Xoutt with
target t , Ex∼Xoutt [д(x)(t)] is the expected confidence. We then report
Table 7: Minimum and maximum of expected confidence
over all output classes of a WRN-28-10 model (trained on
CIFAR-10 dataset) for unmodified and adversarial OOD in-
puts. High Min. and Max . values demonstrate that OOD ad-
versarial examples can achieve target classification to any
output class with high confidence.
OOD Dataset
Image
type
metric MNIST ImageNet VOC12
Random
photographs
Gaussian
noise
Unmodified
Min. 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Max . 0.62 0.29 0.17 0.20 0.97
Adversarial Min. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Max . 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
the minimum Min. and maximum Max . of this expectation over
targets t in Table 7.
Unmodified OOD data: For unmodified OOD images, the adver-
sary doesn’t have control over target classification and output con-
fidence. As an example, for unmodified MNIST images as OOD
inputs, one class is rarely predicted (resulting inMin. = 0), while
another class is predicted with an average confidence of 0.62. This
indicates that while some targets can be met confidently with un-
modified OOD data, not all outputs are equally likely for a given
PoutX and that targets T ∈ Y may not be reachable with unmodified
OOD data.
High-confidence targetedmisclassification: On the other hand,
it is clear that for OOD adversarial examples, any desired target
class can be achieved with high confidence as both the Min. and
Max . values are high. This holds across OOD datasets.
C DETAILED RESULTS: ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLE DETECTORS
In this section, we evaluate OOD attacks against the state-of-art ad-
versarial example detectors, including feature squeezing [128] and
MagNet [86] (recall Section 2.3.2). Target success rate in presence
of these detectors refers to the percentage of adversarial exam-
ples which both evade the detectors and achieve target label after
classification.
Summary of results. Previous work [17, 52] has shown that these
adversarial detectors can be evaded with adaptive adversaries by
successfully generating adversarial examples from in-distribution
data. Our results show that similar to in-distribution data, these
adversarial detectors don’t provide robustness to adversarial exam-
ples generated from OOD data. For feature squeezing, we also show
that OOD data requires a smaller L2 perturbation budget than in-
distribution data for a similar target success rate of corresponding
adversarial examples. We further show that OOD adversarial ex-
amples can achieve up to 97.3% target success rate in presence of
MagNet on a model trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
C.1 Feature Squeezing
Experimental details. We use the joint squeezers (bit depth re-
duction, non-local smoothing, and median filtering) recommended
by the Xu et al. [128] for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet dataset.
Table 8: Target success rate for adversarial examples with
random target labels from different datasets in presence
of adversarial detectors, including feature squeezing [128]
and MagNet [86]. Similar to adversarial examples generated
from in-distribution inputs, OOD adversarial examples are
also able to evade the adversarial detectors with a high suc-
cess rate (with the exception of MagNet for models trained
on the MNIST dataset, which is explained in Section C.2).
Feature squeezing [128] MagNet [86]
Test (↓) \ Train (→)
dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet
MNIST
(ϵ = 0.3)
CIFAR-10
(ϵ = 8)
MNIST 98.1 100.0 3.12 32.3 18.0
CIFAR-10 99.2 100.0 96.1 0.7 90.1
ImageNet 99.3 100.0 85.1 0.8 92.5
VOC12 99.3 100.0 96.0 0.8 96.9
Internet
Photographs 98.1 100.0 85.1 1.2 97.3
Gaussian
Noise 100.0 100.0 25.0 0.0 93.9
The corresponding models for these datasets areM3, WRN-28-10,
and MobileNet (see Table 3). We use Adam [66] solver with L2 per-
turbation and straight-through-estimator approach from Athalye et
al. [7]. We report the target success rate of adversarial examples for
feature squeezing in Table 8. Based on these results, the following
two conclusions can be drawn:
Adversarial examples generated from both in- and out-of-
distribution images achieve high success rate: For all target
models, we observe that the adaptive adversary can achieve a
high success rate (in most cases, around 100%) for OOD and in-
distribution adversarial examples. This is because Feature Squeez-
ing uses a non-adversarial trained model, which lacks robustness
once the adversary can calculate information gradients in presence
of the squeezers.
Most OOD adversarial examples from require less input per-
turbation: In addition to achieving high target success rate, adver-
sarial examples generated from OOD datasets, also require less in-
put perturbation. For networks trained on MNIST dataset, the mean
l2 norm of input perturbations for MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets is
5.67 and 2.12 respectively. Similarly, for CIFAR-10 trained model,
the mean perturbation required for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet images
is 1.24 and 1.00 respectively.
C.2 MagNet
We follow the code released by Meng and Chen [86] to train the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 classifiers and corresponding autoencoders1.
The models for MNIST and CIFAR-10 areM3 and All Convolution
Net [112], as shown in Table 3. We consider an adaptive adversary
which incorporates the distance between input and projected output
from the autoencoder into the loss function. The summary of key
results, presented in Tabel 8, for MagNet is:
OOD adversarial examples can achieve high target success
rate for model trained on CIFAR-10. As shown in Table 8 in
the setting of PGD-xent attacks and random target labeling, OOD
1https://github.com/Trevillie/MagNet
adversarial examples except MNIST achieve a target success rate
higher than 92% in presence of MagNet for the model trained on
CIFAR-10 dataset. The target success rate of adversarial examples
generated from in-distribution data is 90.1%.
OOD adversarial examples have reduced effectiveness for
MNIST models. For the model trained on the MNIST dataset,
we observe that the distance values between the projection of au-
toencoder and original OOD input tend to be around 10 times the
threshold used byMagNet. This makes it hard, even for the adaptive
adversary, to reduce the distance while achieving the target classi-
fication at the output for OOD adversarial examples. We observe
that additional pre-processing techniques, such as moving pixels
of input images close to zero i.e., similar to the background of most
images in MNIST, can increase the target success rate from 0 to up
to 12%.
D ADDITIONAL RESULTS: ROBUST
OPEN-WORLD MACHINE LEARNING
To train the classifier in presence of background class, we use 5,000
images from one of the datasets from MNIST, ImageNet, VOC12,
and Random Photographs. The reason to include only 5,000 im-
ages is to avoid data bias when each class in the CIFAR-10 dataset
has 5,000 images. To include multiple OOD datasets, we add one
background class for each. Figure 5 represent the success of the
classifier in rejecting the out-of-distribution inputs. It shows that
datasets such as VOC12 and ImageNet provide a high inter-dataset
and intra-dataset generalization for detection of non-modified OOD
inputs. Extensive experimental results for different attack methods,
datasets are presented in Table 9.
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Figure 5: Classification accuracy of non-modified OOD in-
puts (higher is better). The classification accuracy represents
the percentage of OOD inputs classified to the background
class.
Table 9: Adversarial training with a model augmented with additional background classes to discriminate between in and
out distribution data. The target success rate is reported with PGD-xent attack using ϵ = 8 and random target label selection.
We can see that including a subset of an OOD dataset in training this model significantly decreases the target success rate of
adversarial examples generated from this dataset. Surprisingly, this robustness can generalize to other OOD datasets, which
are not included in the training. In addition, the robustness to multiple datasets can be achieved by including a subset of each
in the training phase.
OOD dataset
for training
ϵ
MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet VOC12
Random
Photographs
Gaussian
Noise
PGD CW PGD CW PGD CW PGD CW PGD CW PGD CW
rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll rand ll
None
1 1 0 1 0 1.3 0 1.3 0 3.2 0 2.6 0 3.5 0 3.5 0 3.6 0 4.5 0 11.0 0 8.4 0
8 5.1 0 5.7 0 22.9 5.1 22.3 4.4 44.9 4.9 39.5 4.6 54.9 11.5 50.3 9.9 46.3 12.2 47.5 11.4 88.6 6.1 87.8 4.6
16 11.9 0 12.5 0 65.6 48.6 60.4 42.7 83.8 53.9 80.3 46.9 91 74.2 87.8 66.9 83.9 63.7 82.1 57.1 100 100 100 100
MNIST
1 0 0 0 0 1.4 0 1.6 0 5.1 0 3.9 0 4.3 0 3.8 0 3.6 0 3.3 0 3.5 0 5.4 0
8 0 0 0 0 24.4 1.7 22.3 1.4 42.9 1.2 41.3 1 51.2 2.4 50.9 1.9 45.4 3.5 44.6 3.5 72.2 0 73.5 0
16 0 0 0 0 65 28.5 61.6 24.8 82.9 17.7 81.7 14.6 90.4 33 89 27.3 82.3 38.3 80.3 31.6 100 0 100 0
ImageNet
1 0.6 0 0.7 0 0.7 0 1 0 0 0 0.2 0 2.1 0 1.2 0 1.8 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0
8 5.5 0 4.6 0 21.2 4.3 23.9 3.2 7.4 0.5 8.3 0.5 36.3 4 34.7 3 34.7 5.8 30.5 5 0 0 0 0
16 13 0 13.4 0 63.7 47.3 60.3 40.7 39.1 13.6 36.7 12.3 84.8 56.6 80.2 48.3 77.2 52.5 72.2 44.3 5.4 0 6 0
VOC12
1 0.5 0 0.4 0 0.5 0 1.4 0 0.6 0 1 0 1.1 0 1.3 0 1.8 0 2.6 0 0 0 0 0
8 5.1 0 5.2 0 23.6 3.7 21.9 3.7 15.8 1.2 17.8 3.7 32.2 2.6 31.8 2.6 33.1 7 34.4 5.3 24 0 24.7 0
16 12.4 0 13.9 0 65.5 46.4 64.8 46.7 54.5 22 56.8 21.9 80.7 52 80.3 52 75.5 49.5 79.9 51.5 100 100 100 100
Random
Photographs
1 1 0 0.7 0 1 0 1.5 0 2.5 0 2.9 0 3.2 0 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 6.6 0 5.8 0 23.2 3.3 20.9 2.4 39.1 4 36.8 3.3 54.5 8.7 51.1 7.8 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.4 42.3 24 45.5 16.4
16 16.4 0 13.8 0 63.8 42.6 61.1 36 81 49.6 76.6 41.6 90.8 69.9 87.1 62.5 38.5 30.2 36.6 29.3 100 100 100 100
All
1 0 0 0.7 0 1.1 0 1.4 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 1 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 21.1 1.2 20.2 1 8.6 0.2 10.5 0.2 31.6 1 31 1 1.3 0.6 1.4 0.6 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 65.6 24.7 63.7 19 49 9.6 45.9 7.8 80.2 28.3 77.1 23.5 43.7 11.4 41.3 10.1 51 4 2.1 46.9 0.2
